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Ukraine and the Evaporating
Hyphen of Market-Democracy
by Monica Eppinger
This post is part of the series Lessons for Liberalism from the “Illiberal East”
Information wars, fake news, kompromat: surprised
Ukrainians have found their lexicon for foreign interference
spread as loan-words across a putative new Cold War.
Narratives of hegemony long familiar in Ukraine have
metastasized, and their protagonists—troll hordes, political
technologists, the Paul Manafortsand Victoria Nulands—have
been set loose far beyond Ukrainian borders. For those who
are anxious that liberalism is stumbling into traps laid by
foreign intelligence, stuck trading off with fascism and
socialism or otherwise in crisis, Ukraine’s recent history
portends an ominous global future.
Even after investigations wind down and sensational
headlines have faded, these new preoccupations may signal
deeper anxieties into which the Ukrainian experience can
lend insight. This post briefly reviews post-Soviet Ukrainian
experiments with governance, law, and legalism, reading in
them a postsocialist diagnosis of liberalism and its
discontents as well as hints at some ways forward.
***
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, reformers set off
for the postsocialist East with their sights trained on two
targets, markets and democracy. Their argument was rarely
articulated comprehensively, but putting the pieces together,
it went something like this: under socialism, the centralized
economy had led to stagnation and inefficiency, while the
state monopoly on property ownership had underwritten
authoritarian political rule. Privatization, so the story went,
would attack the foundation of both economic and political
tragedies of socialism. Prosperity and democracy depended
on it.
Legislating regime change proved to be a slippery
proposition, as legal speech acts, their sites of production,
and their rationalities came into being simultaneously.
Western advisers found in the rule of law a seemingly more
stable signifier. It would serve markets and democracy, each
necessary to the other in a mutually reinforcing virtuous
circle. Geopolitical strategy converged around a goal of

enlarging the community of “market-democracies.”
Economic liberalism, here, became inseparable from
political liberalism, despite their disparate and occasionally
contradictory histories. The link between markets and
democracy became hegemonic.
***
Under this banner, resources for reform poured in—making
Ukraine the largest target of nonmilitary U.S. aid in the
world—but reforms did not go as planned. Milestones
presented as necessary for postsocialist success came and
went, like holding multiparty elections (1994), privatizing
industry (1995), passing a post-Soviet constitution (1996),
decollectivizing land ownership (2001), and adopting new
criminal and civil codes (2001 and 2003). Ukrainian
legislative agendas trudged to the beat of foreign advisors,
but prosperity and rule of law still seemed frustratingly far
off. To critics, the problem with Ukraine was, apparently,
that Ukrainians kept getting in the way. Potential flaws in
the reform paradigm remained unexamined.
While Western advisers fretted and diplomats grew fatigued,
Ukrainians moved on. Some emigrated. Others, in mass
numbers, abandoned decollectivized farmland and sought
new forms of collective life in the cities, wryly referring to
their entry-level identities as “service drones” or “office
plankton.”
At the end of 2013, urbanites took to the streets, nominally
to protest a U-turn on EU integration and more
fundamentally to oppose kleptocratic authoritarianism.
Blooms of office plankton took over the capital’s central
square, the Maidan, where governance and authority took on
new forms. By mid-December, the Maidan had become a
city-within-a-city, run by volunteers organizing everything
from soup kitchens and sanitation to musical entertainment
and mass decision-making.
Not everyone in Ukraine signed on to the Maidan project,
seeing it as primitive or counterdemocratic, working against
a duly elected government. Russian sources portrayed it as
mob rule in violation of the rule of law. In January 2014,
when troops resorted to live fire to clear the square,
repugnance for lethal intervention spread and within a
month the president apparently lost his nerve, fleeing to
Russia in the middle of the night along with many of his
camp. It seemed that the precariat had triumphed over
oligarchy. Shortly thereafter, the annexation of Crimea and a
shooting war in southeastern Ukraine began.

During fieldwork that summer, I witnessed an impressive
spectrum of redirected Maidan activism. Untrained
volunteers, many coming straight from the Maidan, beat
government troops to the front. Childless investment
bankers cooked hot lunches for local schools. Architects held
citizen meetings to plan Maidan memorials. Lawyers met in
parks to draft anticorruption legislation. The current picture,
however, appears more complicated. In formal politics, a
new oligarch has found power; alongside, some of the
creative energy of the Maidan is finding new channels,
ranging from aiding internally displaced persons to
organizing neo-Nazi intimidation. These realms of activity
do not fit neatly into liberalism’s categories of state and civil
society or public and private spheres. The notion of
sovereignty seems both of existential import and oddly
beside the point.
***
The Ukrainian experience, I suggest, offers a postsocialist
diagnosis of liberalism’s ailments. It amounts to more than
distaste for the poetics of authoritarianism, a style that has
come to stand for illiberalism—Vladimir Putin’s shows of
machismo or Donald Trump’s theatrics of nativism—or
resistance to hypocrisy. Yes, it encompasses the weaponized
ethnocentrism of pan-Slavicism, white supremacist
thuggery, and endless wars on terror. But more
fundamentally, in a kind of hidden work of pragmatics, it
pushes against a central assumption that post–Cold War
liberalism made about itself, namely, the felicitous
relationship between markets and democracy. Ukrainian
“failures” of the 1990s expose that assumption and its
possible fallacy. Private property can, it turns out, promote
oligarchy as well as democracy (see Eppinger 2015); market
economics may breed aspirations that take illiberal, or even
more unconventional, forms; citizen action can
institutionalize or fracture critique. The Ukrainian
experience with law and governance introduces questions
about the hyphen in market-democracy: is it necessary?
Disappearing? A mirage all along?
Ukrainian postsocialism reminds us to be attuned to the
hegemony wielded, at times, not through state power but
through the logics of governance. In the space left by
market-democracy’s evaporating hyphen, new forms of
engagement are arising, unmotivated by market forces or
state-based rationalities. They alert us to a time of
innovation, perhaps even beyond Ukraine, among those
finding political and economic liberalism decoupled.
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